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Abstract 
Theory: We draw on established theories concerning strategic politicians, political learn­
ing, and political campaigning to challenge the conventional wisdom that divisive pri­
maries diminish a nominee's chances of winning the general election. We use the concept 
of "political Darwinism" and introduce three new types of variables that move beyond the 
unidimensional focus of the impact of primary vote margins on general election outcomes. 
Hypotheses: Primary vote margins have no independent impact on general election 
outcomes, instead, campaign spending in the primary, the mediating impact of time, 
and the size of the challenger pool are expected to have explanatory power. Methods: 
Regression analysis of all House and Senate incumbent elections from 1974-1988. 
Results: Challengers largely benefit from contested primaries. The challenger who 
survives a tough primary will be the best campaigner and will have benefitted from the 
publicity that such a victory may provide. Incumbents, on the other hand, are hurt 
by the occasional divisiveness that they might face. Furthermore, late primaries tend 
to strengthen the positive effects of primary elections for challengers and weaken the 
negative effects for incumbents. 
The Impact of Primaries on General Election 
Outcomes in the U.S. House and Senate 
R. Michael Alvarez David T. Canon Patrick Sellers 
According to conventional wisdom about electoral politics, candidates who barely survive 
a close primary are less likely to prevail in the general election. Journalists accept this 
relationship as a truism. 1 Political scientists have examined the topic more systematically and 
produced contradictory findings. The relationship is most evident in presidential primaries where 
researchers have attributed the negative impact of divisive primaries to alienated voters [Kenney 
and Rice 1987; Lengle 1980; Piereson and Smith 1975; Southwell 1986] and disgruntled activists 
[Stone 1984, 1986; Buell 1986]. The evidence is murkier for gubernatorial, senatorial, and House 
primaries where some studies have supported the hypothesized relationship [Kenney and Rice, 
1984; Johnson and Gibson 1974; and Bernstein 1977] and others have found mixed or no 
evidence of the negative impact of close primary elections on general election outcomes [Born 
1981; Miller, Jewel, Sigelman 1988; Hacker 1965; Reiter 1979; Westlye 1985; and Kenney 
1988]. 
We argue that previous research on divisive primaries in congressional elections is 
contradictory and inconclusive because it largely neglects to the potentially positive impact of 
close primaries on the nominee's general election chances. Close primaries are not necessarily 
divisive. A competitive challenger primary that keeps the attack focused on the incumbent, rather 
than on intra-party differences, actually promotes the electoral chances of the eventual nominee.2 
1A Nexis search of the 1994 elections revealed 547 references to "divisive primaries," nearly all of which 
referred to the negative impact of close primaries. For one counter-example, see Born 1981, 661, note 35. Born 
cites a New York Times article that noted the positive impact of Hugh Carey's 1978 gubernatorial primary on his 
come-from-behind general election win. 
2We will use the term "incumbent primary" to refer to intra-party challenges to an incumbent and "challenger 
primary" to refer to primaries in the incumbent's opposing party. 
Serious challenges within the incumbent's party, on the other hand, typically reveal weaknesses 
that are often exploited in the general election. Thus, the assumption that close primaries are 
divisive may be accurate for incumbent primaries, but grossly misleading for challenger 
primaries. This study of all U.S. House and Senate incumbent elections from 1974-1988 provides 
the basis for understanding the complexity of primary elections by introducing three new types 
of variables: the number of candidates in the challenger primary, the length of time from the 
primary to the general election, and campaign spending by primary losers. Incorporating these 
additional measures allows us to move beyond the unidimensional characterization of "primary 
divisiveness" as measured by vote margins. 
The Conventional View of Primary Divisiveness and Our Reconceptualization 
In 1990 Harvey Gantt narrowly lost a North Carolina Senate election to Jesse Helms. The 
race attracted national attention because it pitted a liberal black candidate against a famous 
conservative crusader in one of the most costly and bitter Senate races in history. Helms was 
unopposed in his primary and Gantt finished first in a six-man field with 37.5% of the vote. The 
second-place finisher, Mike Easley, received 30.2% of the primary vote. But since Gantt did not 
cross the 40% threshold specified by North Carolina law, he was forced into a runoff with 
Easley. Easley pressed for a runoff despite Gantt's request that Easley concede the race to help 
party unity. Gantt won the runoff election with 57% of the vote, but Helms won the general 
election with 53% of the vote. 
This outcome appears to support the conventional view that close primaries hurt a 
candidate's chances of winning the general election. There are several general explanations for 
this view. First, a close primary may be expensive, leaving the winner short on funds for the 
general election campaign. Second, candidates may vigorously attack each other, opening 
wounds within the party. The short period between the primary and general election may not 
provide the winner enough time to overcome the resentment among voters who supported 
primary losers [Southwell 1986; Kenney and Rice 1987; Hacker 1965]. Third, campaign activists 
may be unwilling to transfer their support from a losing candidate to the nominee, depriving him 
or her of necessary organizational resources [Buell 1986; Stone 1984, 1986; Miller, Jewell, and 
Sigelman 1988]. These dynamics of campaign resources, disgruntlement, and negative affect 
certainly could have cost Harvey Gantt the election. 
A closer examination, however, reveals that the hotly contested primary actually helped 
Gantt. During the Democratic primary, the six candidates refrained from attacking each other, 
directing their fire toward Helms. During the runoff campaign the two Democratic candidates 
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still avoided attacking each other, while Helms launched an attack against Easley, who was 
considered his likely general election opponent. Thus, Gantt entered the general election 
campaign bearing few scars from primary opponents' attacks and enjoying greater name 
recognition after the intense media coverage of the primary and runoff. In winning the 
nomination, Gantt also avoided spending an exorbitant amount, particularly compared to the cost 
of his general election campaign. Finally, as Gantt entered the general election, he "wielded one 
unpredictable and powerful weapon: enthusiasm. His primary and runoff wins had galvanized 
a coalition of traditional Helms opponents, students, and young professionals" [Duncan 1993, 
1116]. It seems likely that Gantt would have not developed the organizational base, name 
recognition, and momentum of his general election campaign if he had been unopposed for the 
Democratic nomination. 
Gantt' s experience reveals at least three ways in which a close primary may help a 
candidate in the general election. First, a difficult primary may provide a "dry run" for a 
candidate and his or her organization. Volunteers are recruited, fundraising lists established, 
campaign themes tested, and potential weaknesses are exposed and dealt with during the primary. 
Second, a close primary receives media coverage which increases the winning candidate's name 
recognition [Ware 1979]. As Gary Jacobson has shown, successful challengers are the ones who 
are able to get their message out to the voters [1992, 143]. If the challenger is unopposed in the 
primary, he or she will probably receive little media coverage until a few weeks before the 
general election. Third, a "political Darwinism" may occur in a tough primary: the winner will 
be toughened by the experience and generate new viability and momentum. This boost is 
especially likely when a candidate exceeds expectations in the primary, as Gantt did in the 1990 
Senate race. 
Our reconceptualization of the impact of primaries on general election outcomes focuses 
on the benefits that challengers derive from a close primary election. We do not deny that close 
primaries may be divisive. However, we argue that the dominant effects in challenger primaries 
are positive, while incumbents are less likely to reap the benefits outlined above. Incumbents 
typically have a campaign-tested organization in place that would not necessarily benefit from 
another election. They do not worry about media coverage as much as challengers. Exceeding 
expectations is difficult because incumbents are expected to win. Thus, a serious primary 
challenge to an incumbent is typically a sign of vulnerability, while a contested primary for a 
challenger may bring many benefits. The next section outlines empirical tests for this hypothesis. 
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A Model of the Impact of Primary Elections on General Election Outcomes 
We test for these contrasting effects of contested primaries by examining all House and 
Senate incumbents elections between 1974 and 1988.3 The dependent variable is the 
challenger's general election vote. The central explanatory variables of our model measure 
the effects of primary elections. Previous work focused narrowly on primary election vote totals, 
measured alternatively as the difference between the vote percentage of the primary winner and 
second-place finisher [Piereson and Smith 1975; Bernstein 1977; Lengle 1980], the winner's 
percentage in both the incumbent and challenger primaries [Born 1981 ], or the difference between 
the primary vote for the nominees in the two primaries [Kenney and Rice 1987; Kenney 1988]. 
We reject the third version because it falsely assumes that challenger and incumbent primaries 
have the same impact on the general election vote.4 The first two versions differ only in the 
30ne methodological concern should be discussed before specifying our model: the potential non-recursive 
relationship between primary and general election vote. Vulnerable incumbents attract challengers in their own 
primaries and the opposing party primaries. This increased candidate activity translates into "divisive primaries" 
(measured as vote margins or totals), which implies a causal relationship that runs counter to traditional expectations. 
That is, in a regression model explaining general election outcomes, a negative coefficient for the divisive incumbent 
primary variable may result from the anticipation of a strong showing by the challenger in the general election 
(which is turn is caused by a scandal, weak economy, poor attention to constituents, etc.). In this manner, a weak 
incumbent performance in the fall produces, at least in part, the divisive incumbent primary rather than the other way 
around. The bias obviously runs in the other direction for challenger primaries. Here, the negative bias may wash 
out any positive relationship between challenger primary vote and general election vote, leading to the false 
conclusion that no relationship exists between the two variables. If the negative bias is strong enough, it may swamp 
the positive effects and produce a negative coefficient for the challenger primary vote variable. This result would 
indicate that a divisive primary--lower primary vote--produces a higher general election vote for the challenger. 
There are three ways to deal with this problem: ignore it [Hacker 1965; Piereson and Smith 1975; Bernstein 
1 977; Lengle 1980], use two-stage least squares (2SLS) [Born 1981], or treat the problem as recursive and introduce 
additional controls for anticipated general election vote [Abramowitz 1988; Kenney 1988]. We opt for the third 
approach on practical grounds. Ignoring the problem is obviously unacceptable. 2SLS introduces additional bias 
[Bartels 1991] and is untenable given the nature of our model. The central problem is the absence of any variables 
that could be used in a first-stage equation. That is, nothing is related to general election vote that is not also related 
to primary election vote. Therefore, we opt for the more practical solution of modeling the relationship as recursive 
while using additional controls for expected general election vote. As Kenney [1988] points out, the general election 
vote cannot literally determine a temporally prior variable; rather the expected general election vote introduces 
potential bias. Therefore, if all the central determinants of general election vote are included as controls, proper 
inferences can be made about the relationship between primary election variables and the general election vote. 
Again, we recognize that this solution is second-best, but it is the only workable one. 
4Abramowitz makes a similar argument about the relative divisiveness measure [1988, 402]. Consider 
a pair of primaries in which both nominees win with 50% of the vote and another instance in which both nominees 
are unopposed. The relative measure takes on a value of zero in both instances, however the two contexts are quite 
different. In the latter case the incumbent is more likely to be a strong position for reelection, while the former 
reveals an incumbent in trouble. On the other hand, as we argue above, the challenger may actually benefit from 
the contested primary and be harmed by running unopposed. 
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relatively small number of primaries with more than two candidates. For our purposes Born's 
measure [ 1981] is preferable because we include the size of the primary pool as an additional 
explanatory variable. Opting for the first measure could falsely attribute explanatory power to 
the pool size variable (i.e. we have stacked the deck against concluding that our new explanatory 
variable is significant). 
As we argue above, limiting the analysis to vote margins may lead to erroneous 
conclusions about the impact of primaries on the general election vote. Vote measures are 
unidimensional and narrow. Close primaries are not necessarily divisive--they may actually help 
challengers in many ways. To provide a more systematic analysis we propose three additional 
measures of the impact of primaries on the general election: the size of the challenger's primary 
pool, the length of time between the primary and the general election, and the campaign spending 
of the primary losers (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics on our new variables). 
(Table 1 about here) 
The number of candidates in the challenger's primary (independent variables are 
indicated in bold) has potentially conflicting effects on general election vote. According to 
traditional theory, primaries with a greater number of candidates are likely to be more "divisive," 
with the nominee winning a lower percentage of the primary vote. As a result, this divisiveness 
theoretically produces a negative relationship between challenger primary pool size and general 
election vote. The first part of this relationship obviously holds, but somewhat surprisingly, the 
second does not. For example, the average winning percentage in the primary decreases from 
64.4% with two candidates to 32.2% with six or more candidates. But, the average general 
election vote for the challenger primary winner increases from 34.6% to 43.2% for these same 
types of primaries. The positive relationship could be explained by the reverse causation outlined 
above: vulnerable incumbents attract multiple challengers, and anticipated votes therefore 
influence the size of the challenger pool. But as we show below, the size of the primary pool 
exerts a strong and positive effect on the challenger's general election vote in a fully-specified 
multivariate model. 
Previous work has overlooked this important characteristic of primaries. While the 
occasional bloody primary involving five or six candidates divides and weakens the challenger's 
party, this type of primary is clearly the exception. The most comprehensive study of House 
primary elections found that, 
" . . .  more than 85 percent of my questionnaire respondents indicated that the incumbent was an 
issue in their primary. In more than half of the cases, everyone took on the incumbent. He or 
she was essentially the only issue; attacking the incumbent was the only strategy" [Maisel 1986, 
82]. With the challenger primary focusing on the incumbent, it makes sense that the more 
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candidates who run, the greater the damage inflicted on the incumbent. Given this 
reconceptualization, we anticipate that the size of the challenger pool should exert a strong, 
positive effect on challenger general election vote. 
In assessing the effects of primary elections, a reliance on primary vote shares is also 
problematic because these effects may be mediated by the length of time between the primary 
and the general election. It is possible that this period of time could either strengthen or weaken 
the effects of primary divisiveness. The latter argument suggests that if a competitive challenger 
primary gives a boost to the eventual nominee (as hypothesized above), this boost will be greater 
if the primary takes place only a month before the general election than if the primary is held 
during the late spring or early summer. Likewise, in an incumbent primary any negative effects 
of greater competition will be greater if the primary is held closer to the general election. On 
the other hand, a lengthy period between the primary and general election could strengthen the 
effects of primary competition. If a competitive challenger primary occurred long before the 
general election, the nominee would have more time to address any weaknesses that arose during 
the primary campaign. For an incumbent, an early primary gives any disgruntled primary 
opponents more time to campaign against and undermine the incumbent's general election efforts. 
We explore these alternatives by specifying a variable, gap, that counts the number of days 
between the primary and the general election. We then interact this variable with the nominee's 
percentage of the primary vote for both the incumbent and challenger primaries (challenger gap 
and incumbent gap). These two variables capture how the period between the primary and the 
general election may mediate the effects of primaries on the nominees' general election fortunes. 
Finally, while the pool size and gap variables provide important additional information 
about the primary election, they are relatively crude indicators. Campaign spending is widely 
regarded as one of the best indicators of the strength of a candidate's campaign [Jacobson 1980, 
1990; Green and Krasno 1988, 1990]. Thus, we include a measure of losing candidates' total 
spending in the challenger's primary and in the incumbent's primary (our analysis with these two 
variables extends only from 1980-1988).5 These variables reveal the limitation of vote margins 
as an indication of primary divisiveness. All primaries in which the nominee receives 60% of 
the vote are not the same. In general, if the losing candidates mount feeble, underfinanced 
campaigns, the vote share measure may overstate the level of divisiveness. But if the primary 
losers make a strong and well-financed challenge to the primary winner, the vote share measure 
may understate the primary's divisiveness. However, we expect these variables to have a different 
5These variables are measured in thousands of 1982 dollars (unlogged). We do not log the primary 
losers' spending because spending in primaries rarely reaches the point of diminishing marginal returns. 
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impact in the incumbent and challenger primaries. For the incumbent, the more money spent by 
the losers, the higher the challenger's vote in the fall (because most of this money will be spent 
attacking the incumbent). For challengers, the picture is more complex. On the one hand, 
money spent by the losers is mostly directed at the incumbent [Maisel 1986, 82], which should 
help the eventual winner of the challenger primary. On the other hand, some of the money may 
be spent to attack the nominee, and a hotly contested primary may force the nominee to spend 
valuable resources that will be needed for the fall campaign. Thus, on balance, we expect 
incumbent losers' spending to have a strong and positive impact on challenger's general election 
vote, and challengers' losers spending to have little or no impact. 
To summarize, we measure the effects of primary divisiveness by going beyond the 
traditional reliance on primary vote shares. We propose five new variables for assessing 
divisiveness: the size of the primary pool; the gap between Election Day and the incumbent' s and 
the challenger's primary interacted with primary vote; and the total campaign spending by losing 
candidates in the incumbent's and challenger's primaries. The inclusion of these measures will 
provide a more complete picture of how primaries affect general election outcomes. We also 
expect that after including these new variables, the traditional measures of primary divisiveness 
will exert no independent effect on general election vote. 
This analysis also requires controls for other influences on general elections that have 
been established in previous models of congressional elections. We use three groups of control 
variables. First, we include a measure of the normal vote that controls for the long-term partisan 
characteristics of each state and district. We operationalize the variable as the average of the 
votes received by the challenger's party in the presidential, senate, house, and gubernatorial races 
in the constituency (state or district) during the previous six years. Accordingly, we expect this 
variable to be positively related to the challenger's general election vote. This measure is a great 
improvement over the typical measure of challenger's party strength (vote of the challenger's 
party in the previous election [Jacobson 1980, 1990; Green and Krasno 1988, 1990; Kenney 
1988; Born 1981]). Second, we include two measures of short-term national forces on general 
election outcomes: the party of the incumbent (scored 2 for a Democratic incumbent, and 1 for 
a Republican) and the change in real disposable income, operationalized as the change in state­
level real disposable income from the previous year. We expect real income change to be 
negatively related to the challenger's vote.6 
A third group of variables controls for short-term, candidate-specific effects. These 
6lnitially we coded versions of this variable interacted with a dummy for the "in party" (the president's 
party) and the "out party." However, given the divided control of government in 10 of the 14 years of this study, 
the simple incumbency-based hypothesis makes more sense. 
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variables are expected to have a significant, positive effect on the challenger's general election 
vote. The first of these variables is the quality of the challenger in the general election, which 
ranges from 4, for an experienced challenger, to 1, for a hopeless or experience-seeking amateur 
[see Canon 1990, for further discussion of this measure]. Another variable equals 1 if the 
incumbent has been involved in a scandal during the previous term; the variable equals 0 
otherwise. In the House models, we include a dummy variable for first-term incumbents, to 
capture the sophomore surge effect. One other short-term variable, previous incumbent's vote, 
is expected to have a negative impact on challenger vote. 
To control for the effects of campaign expenditures, we use measures of both incumbent 
and challenger campaign spending. Following Green and Krasno [ 1988, 1990] and Jacobson 
[ 1990], we use 1982 dollars to control for inflation, take the logs of spending to capture the 
diminishing marginal returns, and add $5000 to both incumbent and challenger spending to make 
the transformation less severe. We expect that increased challenger spending will improve the 
challenger's general election performance. Finally, we follow Abramowitz' s suggestion [ 1988, 
395] of using Congressional Quarterly' s October rating of general election expectations as an 
additional control. The variable ranges from 1 (safe incumbent) to 5 (leans to the challenger).7 
This measure is an especially conservative control for our purposes because an October measure 
would obviously include the effects of any fallout (positive or negative) from the primary 
election. If the primary election variables remain significant, despite the inclusion of this control, 
we can be confident that we have modeled an important relationship. We recognize that this 
method does not "solve" the simultaneity problem, but it is the most workable and practical 
approach. The only bias that remains is if candidates base their decision to enter a primary on 
the basis of variables other than those we have included as controls, and if these additional 
factors are also systematically related to the general election vote. 
Empirical Results from House and Senate Elections 
House Elections 
70ne minor wrinkle in this coding scheme is that CQ's rating of elections changed from a 5-point to a 
7-point scale in 1982. The previous scale included safe Dem., Dem.-favored, toss-up, Rep.-favored, safe-Rep. The 
7-scale expanded the "favored" category to "favored" and "leans." Our scale transforms the partisan scale to an 
incumbency-based scale and then creates a new intermediate category to accommodate the 5-point scale that was in 
effect from 1974-1980. Thus our complete scale is: 1 - safe incumbent, 2 - inc. favored ( 1982-88), 2.5-inc favored 
(1974-1 980), 3 - leans inc., 4 - toss-up, 5 - leans to the challenger (1982-88), 5.5- leans to the challenger (1974-80). 
The 2.5 and 5.5 positions are a reasonable interpolation because they include cases that would have been to either 
side if CQ had used the 7-point scale before 1 982. The alternative is to collapse the 7-point scale into a 5-point 
scale, but valuable information is lost with this procedure. 
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In analyzing both House and Senate races, we examine three alternative models of the 
effects of primary campaigns on general election outcomes. The first specification serves as a 
baseline. It includes the traditional primary vote measures [Born 1981], as well as the other 
control variables commonly found in models of congressional elections. Our second model 
expands the baseline model by adding the measures of primary pool size and the gap between 
primary and general election. The last model adds the two measures of campaign spending by 
losing candidates in the incumbent and challenger primaries.8 
The results of the House models are reported in Table 2. The baseline model produces 
coefficients that are nearly all significant and in expected directions. The only variable that fails 
to achieve significance is real income change. This may be due to the relatively crude nature 
of the measure (which is specified at the state, rather than district-level). Other variables show 
effects that are consistent with previous work. A high quality challenger may be expected to 
receive 2.3% more of the vote than an amateur (.58 * 4). A challenger running in a district in 
which the incumbent received 55% of the vote in the previous general election may expect 3.75% 
more of the vote than one where the incumbent received 80% of the previous vote. Incumbent 
scandals add about 5% to the challenger's vote, while those unfortunate enough to run into the 
"sophomore surge" lose nearly 2%. Challenger spending is one of the most important variables 
in the model; a challenger who spends $500,000 receives 7.4% more of the vote than one who 
spends $50,000. 
(Table 2 about here) 
The most interesting results for our purposes are significant coefficients for the two 
primary vote variables. Incumbent primaries have the negative effect that is predicted by the 
divisive primary literature: challengers facing an incumbent who barely survives a primary with 
50% of the vote will receive 1.6% more of the general election vote than they would against an 
incumbent who was unopposed in the primary. On the other hand, challengers appear to be 
helped by "divisive" primaries. Those who squeak by with 50% receive 1.2% more of the 
8There are many potential methodological problems with pooled time-series data. Such models can be cross­
sectionally correlated, heteroskedastic, and time-wise autoregressive. However, we have strong a priori reasons to 
discount these possible sources of inefficient estimates. The probability of serial correlation is minimized in Senate 
elections by the six-year election cycle. Also, the probability of heteroskedasticity was minimized in our analysis 
by transformations of some variables. For example, change in income was used rather than absolute levels, and 
model adjustments were made to account for difference in state sizes in the Senate models. While conclusive 
statistical tests cannot be conducted for these problems due to the brevity of each state or district's time series, 
examination of the residual plots did not produce any evidence of first-order serial correlation or heteroskedasticity. 
Also, we include dummy variable for each year (except 1988) to control for any national tides that were peculiar 
to a given election. The coefficients for the year dummies are not of substantive interest and are therefore not 
reported. 
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general election vote than those who are unopposed. While this positive effect is not large, it 
runs counter to the conventional wisdom. However, we argue that this anomalous effect is an 
artifact of an under-specified model. Once the additional primary variables are added, the 
challenger primary vote exerts no independent impact on the general election vote. 
Our second model, which also includes all House races involving an incumbent between 
1974 and 1988, adds four additional measures of the impact of primaries on the general election: 
the number of viable candidates in the challenger's primary (we only include candidates who 
receive at least 5% of the primary vote to exclude frivolous candidates), the number of days be­
tween the primary and general elections, and the interaction between the number of days and the 
primary vote for the incumbent and the challenger. Coefficients for the variables not related to 
primary elections are virtually unchanged from the baseline model. Of the two original measures 
of primary elections, the incumbent primary vote margin remains significant and actually 
increases in size by about 50%. A challenger facing an incumbent who won his or her primary 
with 50% of the vote receives 2.45% more of the vote than one who faces an incumbent who 
was unopposed in his or her primary. The challenger primary vote variable now has the positive 
sign predicted by the divisive primary literature. But, the coefficient does not approach statistical 
significance. 
Among the new measures, only the size of the challenger's primary pool is significantly 
related to the challenger's general election vote. For each additional candidate in the 
challenger's primary, the winner receives about 1 % more of the general election vote. Thus, the 
survivor of a six-candidate field can expect nearly a 5% boost in the general election. This 
"political Darwinism" provides strong confirmation of Maisel's findings cited earlier [1986]. 
Because most primaries focus their attention on the incumbent, the greater the number of 
candidates, the greater the damage inflicted on the incumbent. This relatively strong effect may 
also reflect political learning [Hershey 1984] and media coverage. Candidates who win a hotly 
contested primary have gained valuable campaigning skills and organizational strength. 
Furthermore, challengers who are unopposed in primaries may be largely ignored by the media 
until shortly before the general election. Those in contested primaries will receive additional 
coverage and some momentum heading into the fall. 
The final model provides the most comprehensive test of the impact of primaries on 
general elections. The two variables added in Model 3--spending by the losing candidates in the 
challenger and incumbent primaries--are the best measure of the strength of the primary 
campaigns. Again, the overall model remains quite stable, with only minor changes in the 
magnitude of most of the coefficients. The three exceptions are party and incumbent 
expenditures, which are no longer significant, and the sophomore surge variable, which drops by 
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about a third. Given that this model covers a different period ( 1980-1988), its stability is 
remarkable. In this fully-specified model, the traditional measures of primary divisiveness wash 
out entirely: neither the incumbent primary vote nor the challenger primary vote have an 
independent impact on general election vote. 
Our new measures demonstrate that primary elections have an impact on general elections 
that are far more complex than previously demonstrated. First, the number of candidates in the 
challenger's primary continues to exert a sizeable and significant effect on general election vote, 
adding 1 % to the challenger's vote for every additional candidate. Second, spending by losers 
in the incumbent' s primary also has a significant effect. The challenger's general election vote 
increases by 1. 14% for every additional $ 100,000 spent by the incumbent primary losers. This 
finding, coupled with the significant impact of the incumbent' s primary vote in models 1 and 
2, support our argument that incumbents are generally hurt by contested primaries, while 
challengers are actually helped. 
The length of time between the primary and general elections is one remaining ace up the 
candidates' sleeves. A primary closely preceding the general election can help both incumbents 
and challengers, but for different reasons. Table 3 compares a number of hypothetical contested 
and uncontested primaries. The negative effects of divisiveness on incumbents' general election 
fortunes are greater when the primary precedes the general election by a lengthy period of time. 
When compared to an uncontested incumbent primary 200 days before the general election, a 
highly contested incumbent primary at the same time boosts the challenger's general election vote 
by about 5%. When the primary occurs 30 days before the general election, the challenger's 
general election vote rises by 3.67%. Consequently, the negative effects of divisive-ness in 
incumbent primaries are weaker when the primary is held in the fall. After a late primary, 
disgruntled primary opponents of the incumbent may have less time to campaign and mobilize 
against the incumbent. 
(Table 3 about here) 
Challengers may also benefit from late primaries. When a contested challenger primary 
is compared to an uncontested one, the positive effects of divisiveness are always greater for 
primaries that occur close to the general election. Early primaries, in contrast, appear to provide 
a smaller boost for challengers. This pattern makes intuitive sense. The momentum from a 
convincing primary win can easily help a challenger's general election campaign if the primary 
occurs during the fall. After an early primary win, in contrast, any momentum may dissipate 
before the general election campaign begins. 
Overall, the overwhelming impact of contested primaries on the challenger's general 
election vote is positive. When compared to the winner of an uncontested early primary, a 
1 1  
challenger who defeats five other candidates in a late primary will receive a 9-point boost in the 
general election. This impact is large enough to have turned 527 losers into winners during the 
period of our study. 
Senate Elections 
The results for U.S. Senate elections from 1974-1988 are presented in Table 4. We find 
that many of the variables have similar effects in Senate and House elections-the state's normal 
vote, challenger quality, scandals, challenger expenditures, and expectations about the general 
outcome. But, the results are generally weaker than the findings for House elections. All of the 
variables, particularly those related to primaries, reach a much lower level of significance. The 
smaller t-statistics result at least partially from the smaller number of races used in estimating 
the models for the Senate (228 cases, versus 2576 for the House). The smaller data set makes 
it more difficult to uncover the effects of primaries on general election outcomes. 
(Table 4 about here) 
In Model 1 for the Senate elections, the incumbent' s primary vote is positive, and not 
statistically distinct from zero. Notice, however, that the estimated effect of the challenger's 
primary vote is negative and statistically significant-just as in the House results. Divisiveness 
in the challenger's primary again helps the nominee's general election chances. A challenger 
winning a tough primary contest (50%) would receive 2.15% more of the general election vote 
than a challenger unopposed in the primary. This effect is almost twice that found in the House 
model. 
Surprisingly, in Model 2 for the Senate elections the estimated effects of both the 
challenger and incumbent primary vote totals increase in magnitude, and keep the same sign. 
However, while the challenger's primary vote drops to statistical insignificance, the incumbent's 
primary vote becomes significant. Our new primary variables also differ in the Senate model 
when compared to the House. Here, the number of viable candidates in the challenger's primary 
has little effect on the general election outcome, a stark contrast to the House results. 
Consequently, it is difficult to make a case for "political Darwinism" in Senate elections. 
The gap between the primary and the general election appears to exert a similar effect in 
the House and Senate, at least for incumbents. In Model 2 for the Senate, the gap and its 
interaction with incumbent primary vote produce significant coefficients. The substantive effects 
of these variables are similar to those reported in Table 3 (for the House). In a primary occurring 
30 days before the general election, a Senate incumbent taking 50% of the primary vote will win 
5.3% more of the general election vote than an incumbent facing no primary opposition. If the 
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primary occurs 200 days before the general election, the incumbent facing a divisive primary will 
win 3.2% less of the general election vote than the incumbent with no primary opposition. 
Again, primary divisiveness appears less harmful for incumbents if the nomination contest occurs 
close to the general election. 
Unfortunately, including primary losers' spending (Model 3) cuts our sample by 40% 
because reliable data on these expenditures exist for only the 1980-88 period. Consequently, 
none of the estimated effects of primary races on Senate general election outcomes are 
statistically significant in Model 3. The estimated effects of primary loser expenditures are both 
positive, as in the House models, but here both are also statistically insignificant. 
Discussion and conclusion 
This research provides three significant advances over previous work on the impact of 
congressional primary elections. First, this paper is the most comprehensive study of 
congressional primary elections ever conducted. For example, Richard Born's analysis 
covered 16 years of House elections, but did not include Senate elections. Also, the last year 
in his study was 1976; clearly an update is needed. Kenney's study is more recent and 
covers Senate elections (from 1974-1984), but his House model only includes the elections of 
1984. 
Second, despite the massive evidence that money is crucial for success in 
congressional elections, no comprehensive studies of the impact of primaries have included 
campaign spending as a control. Further-more, we include here for the first time the money 
spent by the losers in challenger and incumbent primaries as an explanatory variable. 
Third and most importantly, this study moves beyond the unidimensional focus on 
vote margins and vote totals in assessing the impact of primaries on general elections. This 
focus led previous scholars to conclude erroneously that primaries either hurt congressional 
candidates, or had no effect. We conclusively show that incumbents are hurt and challengers 
are helped by hotly contested primaries. Incumbents bear the brunt of attack in both sets of 
primaries, so challengers, in general, come out ahead. A political Darwinian argument also 
applies. The challenger who survives a tough primary will be the best campaigner and will 
have benefitted from the publicity that such a victory may provide. In addition, a primary 
win can provide the challenger's campaign organization with a test run for the general 
election, and give the organization an more accurate understanding of the skills and resources 
needed to win in November. An overwhelming primary win can also provide a previously 
unknown but strong challenger with concrete evidence of his or her strength, which in tum 
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assists with fundraising. 
Contested primaries obviously may hurt specific candidates. The campaign trails are 
littered with the remains of campaigns that were ripped apart by intra-party divisions. 
Candidates may be weakened by vicious attacks from within the party, and their campaign 
war chests may be decimated by the financial demands of a tough primary battle. We do not 
deny that these debilitating primaries occur. Rather, we argue that they are the exception 
rather than the rule. Our findings show that challengers largely benefit from contested 
primaries. Incumbents, on the other hand, are hurt by the occasional divisiveness that they 
might face. Furthermore, late primaries tend to strengthen the positive effects of primary 
elections for challengers and weaken the negative effects for incumbents. 
These findings lead to a different perspective on the many ways that divisive primaries 
can influence general election campaigns. The winners of these primaries do not enter the 
general election campaign with a clean slate. But, neither do they always begin the fall 
campaign bearing scars from a debilitating struggle. They can enter the fall race with more 
publicity and campaign experience than candidates from easy primary races. Students of 
general election campaigns would therefore be well-advised to incorporate the complex effects 
of primary campaigns into their studies. 
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Mean 
Standard deviation 
Minimum value 
Maximum value 
Number of cases 
Table 1. New Measures of the Impact of Primaries 
on General Election Outcomes, Summary Statistics 
Number of Number of days Campaign spending 
candidates in between 
challenger primary and Incumbent Incumbent Challenger 
primary general election primary primary primary 
winner losers winner 
1.69 123.71 239,896 13,814 109,501 
1.00 57.99 199,799 50,474 162,260 
1 28 6,068 4,156.28 4,156 
8 245 3,068,221 1,188,857 2,337,537 
2,599 2,599 2,597 1,638 2,597 
Challenger 
primary 
losers 
17,715 
53,445 
4,156 
974,648 
1,638 
Table 2. The Impact of Primaries on Challengers' General Election Vote, 
U.S. House Elections, 1974-1988 
(standard errors) 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
-3.86 -6.66* -2.87 Intercept 
(2.92) (3.89) (5.00) 
.12*** .12*** .18*** Normal vote 
(.017) (.018) (.022) 
1.25*** 1.18*** .27 Party 
(.27) (.27) (.32) 
-.15*** -.15*** -.14*** Previous Incumbent Vote (.012) (.012) (.015) 
-.051 -.051 -.058 Change in Real Income 
(.049) (.05) (.067) 
.58*** .54*** .60*** Challenger Quality 
(.12) (.122 (.15) 
5.09*** 5.07*** 5.41 *** Scandal 
(.93) (.92) (1.10) 
-1.87*** -1.87* -1.25** Sophomore Surge (.33) (.33) (.41) 
.48* .47** .21 Logged Incumbent Spending 
(.20) (.20) (.25) 
3.55*** 3.51 *** 3.21 *** Logged Challenger Spending 
(.11 )  ( .11) (.13) 
.84*** .81*** .51 *** October CQ forecast 
(.13) (.13) (. 1 4) 
-.024*** .0 1 5  .0007 
Challenger Primary Vote 
(.0057) (.016) (.020) 
-.032** -.049* -.027 Incumbent Primary Vote 
(.0 1 1) (.025) (.034) 
.96*** 1.00*** 
Challenger Primary Pool Size 
(.25) (.32) 
-.0097 -.028 
Gap 
(.018) (.023) 
.0015 -.0 1 6  
Incumbent Primary Vote * Gap 
(.017) (.022) 
-.0024 .018# 
Challenger Primary Vote * Gap 
(.0099) (.012) 
.0114** 
Inc. Primary Losers' Spending (.0035) 
.000082 
Chai. Primary Losers' Spending 
(.0030) 
Number of observations 2576 2576 1627 
SEE 6.26 6.24 5.94 
Adj. R-square .63 .63 .64 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p < .05; # p < .10 
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Type of 
primary 
Incumbent 
primary 
Challenger 
primary 
Table 3. Predicted General Election Vote for Challengers, 
Given Varying Levels of Primary Competition and Spending 
Spending 
Primary 
vote 
by 
percentage 
primary of primary 
losers winner 
$0 100 
$50,000 50 
$300,000 50 
$0 100 
$50,000 50 
$300,000 50 
$0 1 00 
$50,000 50 
$300,000 50 
$0 1 00 
$50,000 50 
$300,000 50 
Number of 
days between 
the primary 
and general 
elections 
30 
30 
30 
200 
200 
200 
30 
30 
30 
200 
200 
200 
Number of 
candidates 
m 
challenger's 
primary 
2 
6 
2 
6 
Predicted 
general 
election 
vote of 
challenger 
34.34 
35. 1 6  
38.01 
29.92 
32.10 
34.95 
34.34 
35.07 
39.09 
29.92 
29.12 
33. 1 4  
Impact of primary 
on the challenger's 
general election 
vote, given the 
specified conditions 
+.82 
+3.67 
+2.18 
+5.03 
+.73 
+4.75 
-.80 
+3.22 
Note: Entries are based on the coefficients reported in Model 3, Table 2. Calculation of predicted general 
election vote for incumbent (challenger) primary winner assumes that only one candidate entered the 
challenger (incumbent) primary. 
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Table 4. Impact of Primaries on Challengers' General Election Vote, 
U.S. Senate Elections, 1974-1988 
(standard error) 
Independent variables Model I Model 2 
35.8*** 25.0*** Intercept 
(5.57) (8.36) 
.143** .144** Normal vote 
(.061 )  (.061) 
1.17 1.27 
Party 
(.923) (.922) 
.046 .010 
Change in real income 
(.070) (.073) 
1 .08** 1.00* 
Challenger quality 
(.460) (.460) 
7.51 ** 8.63*** 
Scandal 
(2.95) (2.99) 
-.162 -.148 Logged Incumbent Spending 
(.524) (.524) 
2.60*** 2.55*** 
Logged Challenger Spending 
(.371) (.374) 
2.42*** 2.41 *** 
October CQ forecast 
(.457) (.459) 
-.043* -.062 
Challenger Primary Vote (.020) (.049) 
.006 .136# 
Incumbent Primary Vote 
(.032) (.071) 
.064 
Challenger primary pool size 
(.426) 
.102* 
Gap 
(.051) 
.001 * 
Incumbent Primary Vote* Gap 
(.0006) 
.0002 Challenger Primary Vote* Gap (.0004) 
Inc. Primary Losers' Spending 
Chai. Primary Losers' Spending 
Number of observations 228 228 
SSE 6.31 6.28 
Adj R-square .59 .60 
*** p < .001 ,  ** p < .01, * p < .05, # p < .10 
Note: Dummy variables for election years are not presented here. 
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Model 3 
34.7*** 
(10.9) 
.014 
(.067) 
.970 
(1.07) 
-.068 
(.072) 
.417 
(.549) 
8.05*** 
(3.36) 
-.529 
(.508) 
2.79*** 
(.505) 
2.82*** 
(.661) 
.057 
(.057) 
-.128 
(.087) 
.256 
(.421) 
-.016 
(.060) 
.0006 
(.0007) 
-.0006 
(.0004) 
.00002 
(.00003) 
.00003 
(.00002) 
1 36 
5.43 
.67 
Bibliography 
Abramowitz, Alan I. I 989. " Campaign Spending in U.S. Senate Elections." Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 14: 487-507. 
Abramowitz, Alan I. 1988. " Explaining Senate Election Outcomes." American Political Science 
Review 82: 385-403. 
Abramowitz, Alan I. and Jeffrey A. Segal. 1992. Senate Elections. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Bartels, Larry M. 1991. "Instrumental and 'Quasi-Instrumental Variables."' American Journal of 
Political Science 35:777-800. 
Bernstein, Richard A. 1977. "Divisive Primaries Do Hurt: U.S. Senate Races, 1956-1972." American 
Political Science Review 71: 540-45. 
Born, Richard. 1980. " Changes in the Competitiveness of House Primary Elections." American 
Politics Quarterly 4: 495-512. 
Born, Richard. 1981. "The Influence of House Primary Election Divisiveness on General Election 
Margins." Journal of Politics 43: 64-661. 
Buell, E.H. 1986. "Divisive Primaries and Participation if Fall Presidential Campaigns: A Study of the 
1984 Hew Hampshire Primary Activists." American Politics Quarterly 14: 376-90. 
Canon, David T. Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United States Congress 
Chicago, II.: University of Chicago Press. 
Campbell, James E. And Joe A. Sumners. 1990. "Presidential Coattails in Senate Elections." 
American Political Science Review 84: 513-24. 
Duncan, Philip. 1993. Politics In America, 1994. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. 
Green, Donald P. and Jonathan S. Krasno. 1988. "Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: 
Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections." American Journal of 
Political Science 32: 884-907. 
Hacker, Andrew. I 965. "Does a Divisive Primary Harm a Candidate's Election Chances?" American 
Political Science Review 59: 105-10. 
Hershey, Marjorie Randon. I 984. Running for Office: The Political Education of Campaigners 
Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House. 
Jacobson, Gary C. 1980. Money in Congressional Elections. New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press. 
19 
Jacobson, Gary C. 1992. Politics of Congressional Elections. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 3rd 
Edition. 
Jacobson, Gary C. and Samuel Kernell. Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections. Hew Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2nd ed. 
Kenney, Patrick. I 988. "Sorting Out the Effects of Primary Divisiveness in Congressional and 
Senatorial Elections." Western Political Quarterly 4 1: 765-77. 
Kenney, Patrick J. and Thomas W. Rice. 1984. "The Effect of Primary Divisiveness in Gubernatorial 
and Senatorial Elections." Journal of Politics 46: 904-15. 
Kenney, Patrick J. and Thomas W. Rice. 1987. "The Relationship between Divisive Primaries and 
General Election Outcomes." American Journal of Political Science 31: 31-44. 
Lengle, J.I. I 980. "Divisive Presidential Primaries and Party Electoral Prospects, 1932-76." American 
Politics Quarterly 8: 261-77. 
Maisel, L. Sandy. 1986. From Obscurity to Oblivion: Running in the Congressional Primary. 
Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, Rev. Ed. 
Miller, Penny M., Malcolm Jewell, and Lee Sigelman. 1988. "Divisive Primaries and Party Activists: 
Kentucky, 1979 and 1983." Journal of Politics 50: 459-70. 
Piereson, J.E. and T.B. Smith. 1975. "Primary Divisiveness and General Election Success: A 
Reexamination." Journal of Politics 37:555-62. 
Schantz, Harvey L. 1980. " Contested and Uncontested Primaries for the U.S. House." Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 4: 545-62. 
Southwell, Patricia L. I 986. "The Politics of Disgruntlement: Nonvoting and Defections among 
Supporters of Nomination Losers, 1968-84. Political Behavior 8: 81-95. 
Stimson, James A. 1985. "Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay." American Journal of 
Political Science 29: 914-47 
Stone, Walter J. 1986. "The Carryover Effect in Presidential Elections." American Political Science 
Review 80: 271-79. 
Tufte, Edward R. 1975. "Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections." 
American Political Science Review 69: 812-26. 
Ware, Alan. "Divisive Primaries: The Important Questions." British Journal of Political Science 9: 
381-84. 
Westlye, Mark C. 1985. "The Effects of Primary Divisiveness on Incumbent Senators, 1968-1984." 
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New 
Orleans. 
20 
